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COMPLYING WITH INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A CALL FOR FREE AND FAIR
ELECTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
frica has an extensive history of ethnic conflict.1 During
the colonial era, many ethnic groups in Africa were arbitrarily joined together in an effort to form territorial units with
little regard for the pre-existing boundaries.2 Following independence, many African countries retained the boundaries that
were established by colonial powers.3 The ethnic conflict that
ensued has inevitably been reflected in the political processes
and has largely prevented these countries from experiencing
the stability necessary to establish a true democracy.4
An emerging right to democratic governance has been recognized by the international community.5 This right is based on
the theory that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed.6 This requires an electoral process charac7
terized by public participation. Thus, an important manifestation of this right is holding free and fair elections. Because
“representative democracy is an indispensable condition for

A

1. Okechukwu Oko, Partition or Perish: Restoring Social Equilibrium in
Nigeria through Reconfiguration, 8 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317, 319 (1998)
[hereinafter Oko, Partition or Perish]. Chinedi Reginald Ezetah, Minority
Rights: International Law of Self-Determination and the Ogoni Question: Mirroring Africa’s Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 811,
812 (1997).
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 124 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
et al. eds., 2002).
3. The preservation of colonial borders was the result of uti possedetis.
According to this principle, borders drawn under the colonial regime that corresponded to a colonial entity were preserved when the colonies achieved independence. Id. at 124.
4. See Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 318–19. See also Linda
Maguire, Power Ethnicized, 2 BUFF. JOUR. INT’L L. 49 (1995) (discussing how
the policies of the colonial powers contributed to ethnic divisions in African
colonies, especially in Rwanda and Burundi).
5. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AMER. J. INT’L L. 46, 46–47 (1992).
6. Id. at 46.
7. Id. at 63.
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[the] stability, peace and development,” elections are especially
important in countries that have historically been plagued by
ethnic conflict and are emerging from transitional periods.
While many African states have established democratic governments through elections, the political environments in which
these elections are held have generally been regarded with suspicion. Indeed, many elections are marred by reports of threats,
intimidation, harassment and violence.9 The hostile political
environment in which many African elections are held naturally
raises questions about the “fairness” of these elections. Instead
of democratic governments, citizens have been subjected to oppressive regimes, which justify their political repression as
based on a need to combat the security threats that ethnic conflicts pose.
Although these countries have taken substantial steps towards establishing a democratic government, this Note argues
that there are international and domestic obligations to hold
free and fair elections that have not been fulfilled. As an example, this Note will examine elections in Nigeria and Rwanda,
two African states emerging from a transitional period. Part II
will provide an overview of the political history in these two
states. Part III will discuss the sources of the obligations to
hold free and fair elections. Part IV will discuss the failure of
these two countries to fulfill their obligations by examining the

8. O.A.S. Charter, pmbl., available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/
agres1080.htm.
9. See Ellen Knickmeyer, Security Forces Move Out in Force to Quell
Challenges to Africa’s Longest-reigning Ruler, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 3, 2003
(For example, President Eyadema of Togo, a West African country, has been
in power since 1963. Although Togo holds elections, President Eyadema has
routinely used force to quash any opponents. Following the 1998 presidential
elections when Eyadema abruptly stopped the vote count and declared himself
the winner, international donors discontinued almost all funds to Togo.). See
also INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ZIMBABWE: ANOTHER ELECTION CHANCE, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), at http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=3142&l=1 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005) (summarizing the
problems with the political environment in Zimbabwe leading up to the March
2005 elections including how President Mugabe has “used economic bribery,
bullying and propaganda to increase his support and remain in power.”). See
also Franck, supra note 5, at 50 (The results of the 1988 national elections in
Senegal were widely regarded as fraudulent by both opposition parties and
social institutions. As a result, the opposition parties boycotted the 1990 local
elections.).
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repressive atmosphere in which the recent elections took place,
the constitutional violations that resulted, and the inadequacy
of the mechanisms designed to ensure free and fair elections.
This Note will conclude in Part V that, in addition to fulfilling
international and domestic obligations, free and fair elections
are extremely important in countries plagued by ethnic conflict
and emerging from a transitional period because they provide
legitimacy both internationally and domestically.
II. POLITICAL HISTORY
A. Nigeria
During the colonial era, many of the different ethnic groups
10
In Nigeria,
in Nigeria were forced into one “nation-state.”
11
there are approximately 250 ethnic groups. There are three
main ethnic groups: the Hausas in the North, the Yorubas in
the West and the Ibos in the East.12 Within these main ethnic
groups are many smaller groups.13 The British disregarded the
fact that many of these ethnic groups existed as separate tribal
communities with their own languages, religion and culture.14
Despite this forced unification of different ethnicities, the colonial policies utilized by the British actually encouraged ethnic
divisions and set the stage for ensuing ethnic distrust.15 Because Britain did not treat Nigeria as a single nation, its citi-

10. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 327–28.
11. Ezetah, supra note 1, at 813.
12. Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes
Towards a More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89,
102–03 (2003) [hereinafter Oko, Confronting Transgressions].
13. Id. at 103.
14. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 327.
15. See id. at 330–31. In response to Britain’s disregard of customary values and tradition, many citizens found solace in their ethnic groups. This had
the effect of strengthening their ties to their ethnic groups and promoting
loyalty to the different ethnic groups rather than to the state as a whole. In
1900, Britain adopted a policy of ruling the North and South as two separate
entities and, in 1914, Southern Nigeria was divided into eastern and western
regions. Because each region was compromised of different ethnic groups,
British policy created a breeding ground for ethnic distrust among the different regions. Id.
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zens did not consider themselves part of one nation and, thus,
limited their concerns to their own ethnic groups.16
1. Post-Independence
17

When Nigeria achieved independence in 1960, it had an opportunity to establish an appropriate government for its multiethnic society. The government that was established, however,
consisted of a parliamentary democracy in which political leaders tended to represent their respective ethnic groups.18 The
ethnic distrust formed during the colonial era contributed to
this post-independence political environment of ethnic selfinterest in which the nation’s welfare as a whole was rarely the
focus of political campaigns.19 In this political environment, it
was no wonder that the first post-independence elections in the
republic of Nigeria proved useless as politicians “brutally displayed their lack of respect for democracy.”20
2. Military Rule
Nigeria’s transition to democracy was undermined by the corruption that had infused the political process. The solution to
Nigeria’s degeneration into anarchy came in the form of a military government.21
In 1966, a military intervention was
claimed necessary in order to avoid the country’s demise.22 Following an unsuccessful coup in which the federal prime minister and finance minister were murdered,23 General Ironsi, who
was in command of the Nigerian army, took over administration
of the country at the request of the remaining members the
government.24 The military regime promptly promulgated the
16. See id. at 331–32.
17. THE CARTER CENTER AND NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFF.,
OBSERVING THE 1998–1999 NIGERIA ELECTIONS, FINAL REPORT 13 (1999) [hereinafter CARTER CENTER REPORT], at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/
1152.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
18. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 331–33.
19. Id. at 332.
20. Id. at 333.
21. Id. at 333–34.
22. Elizabeth Knight, Facing the Past: Retrospective Justice as a Means to
Promote Democracy in Nigeria, 35 CONN. L. REV. 867, 872 (2003).
23. Id.
24. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 334.
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25
This deConstitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree.
cree gave the military government the power to “make laws for
the peace, order and good government.”26 Under the pretense of
promoting national unity, the decree suspended the Constitution and left the military regime free to “embark upon wholesale destruction of the democratic process.”27 The military regime attempted to ensure compliance with its rule by quashing
dissenters and undermining the entire system of government.28
The military, however, was not immune from the ethnic divisions that plagued the country as a whole and nearly six
months later, the army split off into ethnic groups.29
The next military regime, headed by Colonel Gowon, was
again the product of a coup in 1966.30 This time, like the last,
the justification for military intervention was a need to avoid
the disintegration of the country.31 In response to growing ethnic tensions between the east and north regions, Colonel Gowon
divided all four regions into twelve different states.32 The result, however, was a polarization of ethnic groups in newly created territorial divisions in which some states consisted of a
single ethnic group.33 A thirty-month civil war ensued after the
eastern region threatened secession, but Colonel Gowon managed to crush the opposition in order to “maintain the territorial
integrity” of the nation and to “assert the ability of the black
man to build a strong progressive and prosperous modern
state.”34 In spite of Colonel Gowon’s promise that there would

25. See Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 573, 591
(2000).
26. Id. at 591 n.83.
27. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 334. In 1966, General Ironsi
promulgated the Unification Decree abolishing all regional governments. He
justified his radical action on the grounds that the Decree would rid the country of all traces of regionalism thereby promoting the cohesion necessary for a
successful government. Id.
28. Knight, supra note 22, at 872.
29. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 335.
30. Id. at 336.
31. Knight, supra note 22, at 873.
32. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 335.
33. Id. (For example, the East Central State, part of the former eastern
region, was comprised solely of Ibos).
34. Id. at 335–36 (Colonel Ojukwu, the former governor of the eastern region, declared the former eastern region the Republic of Biafra). This was not
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be a restoration of democracy following his transitional period
of military rule, by the end of his reign democracy still had not
been restored.35
3. Return to Civilian Government
The military regime headed by Colonel Olusegen Obasanjo
appeared to fare better in keeping its promise to restore democracy. A Constitution Drafting Committee, composed of fifty
36
members from various states and professions, was created. In
an effort to address the concerns of the country’s multi-ethnic
communities, specific provisions were included to discourage
ethnic conflict.37 Most importantly, the new constitution established a presidential system of government,38 finally fulfilling
the military’s promise of a restoration to democracy.
Once the Constitution was promulgated into law on October
1, 1979,39 a Federal Electoral Commission (Commission) was
40
established. The Commission was responsible for organizing
elections and regulating the activities of political parties.41 One
of the main objectives of the Commission was to ensure that all
political associations were open to every citizen, regardless of
their ethnicity, and that each association truly reflected the
multi-ethnic character of the country.42 When the military lifted
the last time Nigeria would be faced with a threat of secession. In October
1990, the Ogoni, an ethnic minority group located in the south of the country,
presented its demand for self-determination to the military government of
General Babangida. Ezetah, supra note 1, at 817–20. The Ogoni’s demands
were met with violent oppression. Id.
35. Colonel Gowon’s reign ended in a coup in 1975. His successor was
General Mohammed, a cabinet minister under Colonel Gowon. See Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 338.
36. Id. at 337.
37. For example, the Constitution prohibited discrimination on the
grounds of ethnic association, encouraged intermarriage among persons from
different ethnic groups and promoted the formation of associations that cut
across ethnic barriers. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1979) § 15(2)–(3)(c)–(d).
38. See id. § 30–42. See also Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 338.
39. See Const. (Enactment) Decree No. 25 (1978) (Nig.).
40. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979)
§ 140(1)(c).
41. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 339.
42. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979)
§ 202(b), (e).

File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 6/8/2005 1:42 PM

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM

1035

the ban on political parties, however, many of the same politicians from the first post-independence political scene returned,43
which set the stage for the elections of 1979.
4. Elections
Election monitors claimed the elections of 1979 were “tolera44
bly free and fair.” This appeared to restore some faith in the
democratic system, as there was no military intervention.
When President Shehu Shagari was re-elected in 1983, however, it became apparent that there had been widespread voterigging and that the election had been a fraud.45 Not surprisingly, the military intervened again and ousted President
Shehu Shagari, this time claiming the need to “redress the nation’s social and economic problems.”46 Presidential elections
were held again in 1993, and Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba businessman, was the apparent winner.47 General Babangida, how48
ever, nullified the elections on the eve of the election results.
Many suspected the General of nullifying the election because
Abiola was perceived as a threat to the northern tribes that
traditionally dominated Nigerian politics.49
43. Oko, Partition or Perish, supra note 1, at 340. Ultimately, the Commission approved five political parties: Great Nigeria’s People Party (GNPP);
National Party of Nigeria (NPN); Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP); Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) and Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). Id. at 339.
44. Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, (N.D.) [hereinafter Nigeria’s History of Turmoil], at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/longterm/nigeria/timeline.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005). Shehu
Shagari of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was elected in October 1979.
Id.
45. RICHARD A. JOSEPH, NIGERIA: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SECOND
REPUBLIC 170–73 (1987).
46. Knight, supra note 22, at 872.
47. Frank Aigbogun, General Takes Control of Nigeria, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov.
18, 1993, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/
nigeria/stories/general111893.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
48. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 13. Both local and international election observers regarded the 1993 elections as “free and fair.” UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Irin Web Special On Nigeria, IRINNEWS.ORG (N.D.) [hereinafter Irin Web Special On Nigeria], at
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/nigeria/defaut.asp (last visited Mar. 6,
2005).
49. Aigbogun, supra note 47. When Abiola declared himself President in
1994 he was arrested and charged with treason. Abiola eventually died in
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Following the annulled election, General Babangida stepped
down and established a civilian government that was promptly
taken over by General Abacha.50 Despite the military government’s promise of a transition to democracy, the subsequent
elections held in 1998 proved to be a ploy to preserve the military’s power.51 Only five parties were permitted to participate
in the elections and all nominated General Abacha.52 The elections were an effort to bolster the military’s image, whose popularity was at an all-time low, both domestically and abroad, by
implementing political reforms in response to the international
community’s growing concern about the government’s brutal
political repression.53 The international community, however,
denounced the elections and many Nigerian citizens voiced opposition to the present government through demonstrations,
riots and increasing acts of violence.54
When General Abacha suddenly died, his successor, General
Abubakar, promptly stepped in and attempted to improve the
image of the government.55 It appeared that the transition to
democracy would take place and, in 1998, Abubakar agreed that
elections would be held by early 1999.56 To facilitate this process, he established an Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in 1998 to organize and supervise the electoral
process.57

prison in 1998. Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, supra note 44. His wife, Kudirat
Abiola, was shot to death in 1996. Id.
50. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 13.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id.
53. Id. In response to the military government’s harassment and detention
of political dissidents, including journalists, human rights activists and politicians, the international community restricted aid and relations with Nigeria.
Id. In particular, the United States and the European Union recalled their
ambassadors and the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in December
1995 condemning the executions. Ezetah, supra note 1, at 822–23.
54. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that there were
also frequent anti-government bombings).
55. Id. at 14 (General Abacha reportedly died of a heart attack).
56. Nigeria’s History of Turmoil, supra note 44.
57. See Const. (Independent National Electoral Commission Decree) Decree No. 17 § 4(1)(a) (1998) (Nig.). A former justice, Ephraim Akpata, was
appointed chair of the commission. CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17, at
16.

File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc

2005]

Created on: 6/8/2005 1:42 PM

FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM

1037

The INEC is authorized to exercise considerable discretion in
the performance of its duties to organize, conduct and supervise
all elections.58 Its duties include conducting voter registration,
compiling authentic voter registers and monitoring political
parties.59 In order to perform its duties, the INEC may establish rules and regulations to govern the operation of the parties
as well as their campaigns.60 In addition, the INEC is author61
ized to issue guidelines to govern the election process.
For the 1998-99 elections, former U.S. President Jimmy
Carter initiated a mission to observe the elections.62 Although
international election monitors agreed that the elections were
an important step in the democratization process, they noted
many “electoral irregularities.”63 In an ironic twist, former mili64
tary ruler, Olusegen Obasanjo was confirmed the winner. It
was alleged that the election was influenced by northern military political power when the Muslim Hausa in northern Nigeria dominated the military and exerted its power to keep a
Christian Yoruba from becoming President for fear that government funds would be diverted away from the North.65 In
spite of the allegations of bribery and recognition of election
process deficiencies, the election was nevertheless hailed as an
important step in the democratic process.66

58. NIG. CONST. (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) 3rd
sched., § 15(a).
59. Id. § 15(e)–(f).
60. Id. § 15(c), (f).
61. See Const. (Independent National Electoral Commission Decree) Decree No. 17 § 4 (1998) (Nig.).
62. See generally CARTER CENTER REPORT, supra note 17. (Local elections
were held on Dec. 5, 1998; State and Governor elections were held on Jan. 9,
1999; National Assembly elections on Feb. 10, 1999 and the National elections
on Feb. 27, 1999.).
63. Id. at 32 (noting that the reported voter turnout greatly exceeded voter
registration).
64. Irin Web Special on Nigeria, supra note 48. Obasanjo was the military
ruler who handed over the government to civilian rule in 1979. Id. Obasanjo
was jailed by General Abacha for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government. Id. He was released just months before the election. Id.
65. Knight, supra note 22, at 886. Although President Obasanjo is of
Yoruba descent, it was alleged that he “had the support of the military and
was controlled by powerful northern political interests.” Id.
66. Id.
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B. Rwanda
1. Colonial History
When Rwanda was colonized by Germany in the late nineteenth century,67 it was inhabited by three ethnic groups: Hutu,
68
Tutsi and Twa. The Tutsi migrated to Rwanda in the fourteenth century, which was already inhabited by the Hutu and
Twa.69 Although the Tutsi were greatly outnumbered by Hutus,
it became the dominant group.70 Rwanda was a monarchy and
the Tutsi kings ruled from the 1600s forward.71 Despite the political dominance of the Tutsi, the Hutu and Tutsi lived in relative peace before colonization.72
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, Rwanda was ceded to
Belgium.73 Like Germany, Belgium administered a colonial policy of indirect rule.74 Unlike Germany, however, Belgium arbitrarily determined who the rulers of Rwanda would be and replaced all Hutu leaders with Tutsis.75 In addition, the Tutsi

67. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55. In the late 1800s, there were many German-led expeditions into the region that would become known as RuandiUrundi, now known as the countries Rwanda and Burundi. Id. By 1899,
Germany exercised “de facto control” over the area through the establishment
of various military outposts and Rwanda became part of German East Africa.
Id.
68. Dorinda Lee Peacock, Comment, It Happened and It Can Happen
Again: The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 899, 911 (1997). The Twa were the original inhabitants of the
region, the Hutu were agriculturalists and the Tutsi were pastoralists. Id.
69. BBC News, Timeline: Rwanda (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Rwanda
Timeline], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/country_profiles/1070329.
stm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
70. Peacock, supra note 68, at 911.
71. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69.
72. Maguire, supra note 4, at 61. The relationship between the Hutu and
Tutsi strongly resembled the European feudal system. Id. The Hutu were
agriculturists and harvested crops on parcels of land and paid the Tutsi to
protect them. Id. Although the social system was based on inequality, each
ethnic group relied on the other, thus, neither group resorted to violence
against the other. Id.
73. Id. at 55.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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76
also enjoyed economic and educational advancement. The basis of Belgium’s policy was the alleged superiority of the Tutsi,
who most resembled Europeans as they were taller and had
lighter complexions than the Hutu.77 As a result of Belgium’s
policy of preferential treatment, Hutus were systematically excluded from participating in the political, educational and judicial spheres of society.78
When Rwanda was deemed a UN trust territory in 1946, Belgium became responsible for promoting Rwanda’s transition
towards independence.79 Belgium’s policy towards its colonial
inhabitants, however, took a different approach. Instead of exhibiting clear preferential treatment towards the Tutsi, the
Belgians began to promote and incite the existing atmosphere of
ethnic and political tension.80 Although the Belgians implemented constitutional reforms designed to give the Hutu
greater representation in government, the Tutsi retained their
control over government positions.81 Despite the Hutus demand
for representation proportionate to their numbers, the Tutsi
were, naturally, reluctant to relinquish control.82 Finally, as a
result of Hutu discontent and Belgium encouragement, the
Hutu began to rebel against the politically dominant Tutsi.83
In 1959, Hutu discontent manifested itself in a violent uprising that resulted in thousands of deaths.84 Thousands of Tutsis
85
fled to Uganda, including Tutsi King Kigeri V. The result of

76. BBC News, Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/africa/1288230.stm (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
77. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55, 62–64. See also Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 76 (discussing the basis for the Belgians’ preferential treatment of the Tutsi).
78. Maguire, supra note 4, at 55.
79. Id. at 56.
80. Id. at 56–57.
81. Id. at 57. During this period of transition, the Tutsi held all forty-three
of the chiefdoms, 549 sub-chief positions (out of 559) and approximately
eighty-two percent of judicial and agricultural positions. Id.
82. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE POST REPORT, RWANDA [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE RWANDA REPORT], at http://foia.state.gov/MMS/
postrpt/pr_view_all.asp?CntryID=125 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
83. Id.
84. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, supra note 76 (estimating that
more than 20,000 Tutsis were killed).
85. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69.
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the “Rwandan Revolution,” which was primarily led by the
Hutu-dominated political party, Parti du Mouvement de
l’Emancipation Hutu (PARMEHUTU), was the abolition of the
monarchy and the establishment of a republic.86 Thus, when
Rwanda gained independence in 1962, the Hutus were in power
of the newly formed, independent Republic of Rwanda.87
2. Post-Independence
In the years following independence, the Hutu maintained
their political power by systematically discriminating against
88
the Tutsi. Under the repressive Hutu regime, Tutsis were pe89
riodically subjected to waves of killing and ethnic cleansing.
In Uganda, Rwandan refugees, mostly comprised of Tutsi whose
return had been continually prevented by the Hutu government, formed a rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF).90 In 1990, the RPF invaded Rwanda and the civil war
that ensued lasted for three years with a death toll in the thousands.91 In an effort to end the civil war, the Organization for
African Unity (OAU) mediated a peace agreement,92 the Arusha
Peace Accords, between the Rwandan government, headed by
President Habyarimana, and the RPF in 1993.93

86. Maguire, supra note 4, at 57.
87. Rwanda Timeline, supra note 69 (Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, became
president of independent Rwanda).
88. Samantha Powers, Bystanders to Genocide, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Sept. 2001, available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/power.htm (last
visited Apr. 9, 2005).
89. Id. The situation was quite the opposite, however, in Burundi,
Rwanda’s neighboring country. Maguire, supra note 4, at 58. From 1966–
1983, Tutsi ruled Burundi and the Hutu were subject to persecution and periodic killing. Id.
90. L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaa
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 388 (2003).
91. Maguire, supra note 4, at 57. During the civil war of the 1990s France
provided the Hutu regime with military support. See generally PHILIP
GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998) (discussing French action in Rwanda).
92. S.C. Res. 872, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3288th mtg. ¶ 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/872 (1993).
93. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Aug. 4, 1993 [hereinafter Arusha
Peace Accords].
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Under the Arusha Peace Accords, there was to be power sharing among the Rwandan government, the RPF and other newlyformed political parties under a transitional government that
would govern until democratic elections were held.94 The
United Nations established a neutral force, the U.N. Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to assist in the implementation
of the peace agreement and to supervise the establishment of a
new government and elections by December 1995.95 Hutu extremists, however, refused to accept the terms of the peace
agreement and initiated a plan of terror against Tutsis and
Hutu moderates who supported the agreement.96
3. Genocide
In April 1994, the fragile state of security in Rwanda was destroyed literally overnight when President Habyarimana and
President Ntaryamira of Burundi, who were returning from a
97
peace conference, were killed when their plane was shot down.
Within hours of President Habyarimana’s death, the Rwandan
Armed Forces (FAR) and Hutu militia groups98 embarked on a
systematic killing spree targeting Tutsis, politically moderate
Hutus who supported the peace agreement, peacekeepers and
human rights activists.99 Although the 1994 genocide was the
result of a carefully planned attack organized by the Rwandan
Presidential Guard, who reportedly prepared lists of targets in
advance, the violence soon spread and the civilian population,

94. Protocol of Agreement on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a
Broad-Based Transitional Government Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, Oct. 30, 1992, arts. 14,
23(1) [hereinafter Arusha Protocol].
95. S.C. Res. 872, supra note 92, ¶¶ 2–3, 6.
96. Powers, supra note 88.
97. Frontline: The Triumph of Evil: 100 Days of Slaughter: A Chronology of
U.S./U.N. Actions (1999), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
evil/etc/slaughter.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
98. Tully, supra note 90, at 388. The Interahamwe, “Those Who Attack
Together,” and the Impuzaamugambi, “Those With a Single Purpose,” were
trained by extremist Hutus in Rwanda to help carry out the genocide. Id.
99. Powers, supra note 88 (among the first victims was Prime Minister
Agathe Uwilingiyimana who became head of state after President Habyarimana’s death).
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100
encouraged by Hutu-controlled radio stations, also took part
101
in the attacks. By July 1994, however, the RPF had defeated
Hutu extremists and established a new government, the Government of National Unity, thus bringing the genocide to an
end.102

4. Post-Genocide
Following the genocide, Rwanda entered a period of reconstruction. Former President Habyarimana’s political party, the
Mouvement Republicain Nacionale pour la Democratie
(MRND), was outlawed103 and new mechanisms were created to
104
To demonprosecute those responsible for genocidal acts.
strate its commitment to establishing a multi-ethnic government under the Arusha peace agreement, the new government
chose Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu, to be President and a majority of cabinet posts were assigned to members of the Tutsidominated RPF.105 In spite of this action, however, the new government was clearly Tutsi-dominated.

100. See Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International
Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 628 (1997). Radio-Television Libre
des Milles Collines (RTLM) was a semi-private station founded by Hutu extremists that would broadcast propaganda against Tutsis and moderate
Hutus. Id. at 631. The broadcasts were designed to incite attacks against
individuals who were identified and criticized on the air. Id. During the
genocide, RTLM broadcast the names of targets as well as the license plate
numbers of specific vehicles said to contain “accomplices.” Id.
101. Peacock, supra note 68, at 916. It is estimated that approximately
500,000 Tutsis were killed as a result of the 1994 genocide. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WORLD REPORT 2003: RWANDA [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS RWANDA
REPORT], at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/africa9.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
102. Tully, supra note 90, at 389. Following the RPF’s victory, an estimated
two million Hutus fled the country. Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened,
supra note 76.
103. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RWANDA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1995, Mar.
1996, at http://www.state.gov/r/pae/ei/bgn/2861.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2005).
104. Organic Law 8/96, arts. 19–23 (1996) (Rwanda), available at
http://preventgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2005) (The Rwandan government created special chambers within the existing
courts to deal exclusively with genocide cases. In addition, four categories
were established to separate criminals with different degrees of responsibility.).
105. Peacock, supra note 68, at 918.
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The RPF’s political philosophy consisted of the notion that a
“true democracy” could only be achieved through public participation in public affairs and the eradication of ethnicity.106 Because ethnic discrimination was used to legitimize political
power, the RPF ideology aimed to eliminate ethnicity from the
political arena.107 The Rwandan government implemented political policies designed to control the actions of political parties
that were justified by the need to ensure that the opposition did
not foster ethnic division.108 Most notably, political organizing
was banned until 1999.109 Although the motivation for these
policies may have been justified given the highly politicized environment surrounding the genocide, the result was that many
political freedoms were restricted, thus undermining the RPF
ideology of public participation in political affairs.
In April 2000, Paul Kagame, the Tutsi leader of the RPF, became president when President Bizimungu resigned.110 Former
President Bizimungu, who openly criticized his colleagues for
being unnecessarily harsh on the opposition, was essentially
forced to relinquish his post.111 The following year, he and former Minister Charles Ntakirutinka formed a new political
party that was promptly declared illegal by the government.112
In April 2001, Bizimungu was arrested and imprisoned for engaging in illegal political activities and fostering ethnic divisions.113
106. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, “CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY” IN POST-GENOCIDE
RWANDA: EVALUATING THE MARCH 2001 DISTRICT ELECTIONS 3 (2001) [hereinafter ICG REPORT 1], at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report
_archive/A400453_09102001.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 4.
109. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE RWANDA REPORT, supra note 82.
110. BBC News, Profile: Rwanda’s Strongman (Aug. 27, 2003) [hereinafter
Rwanda Profile], at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3170451.stm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2005). (Born in Rwanda, Paul Kagame grew up in Uganda and
had been a soldier for most of his life. In 1979, he joined the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda where he was a guerilla soldier before he was
made head of military intelligence. Kagame along with his friend, Fred Rwigyema, helped establish the RPF.).
111. Id.
112. HUMAN RIGHTS RWANDA REPORT, supra note 101. The political party,
PDR-Ubuyanja, was declared illegal although there was no controlling law
permitting the government to declare its illegality. Id.
113. Id.

File: Lara.MACRO.06.08.05.doc

1044

Created on: 6/8/2005 1:42 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 6/8/2005 3:46 PM

[Vol. 30:3

In November 2000, the National Electoral Commission
(NEC)114 was formed to supervise the March 2001 district elections in which the Rwandan government’s decentralization policy115 would be put into practice. The NEC, which was given
considerable authority, is officially responsible for preparing,
organizing and conducting elections, which includes establishing district and provincial electoral commissions to prepare for
elections at the local level.116 Its primary objective, however, is
to ensure that elections are free and transparent.117 The 2001
district elections were perceived as an important step in the
transition process.118 Although there were very few reports of
electoral misconduct, the tight political control exercised by the
RPF over the elections prevented it from being a democratic
process.119 International monitors observed that voters generally selected candidates whom they believed the influential
members of the community would support.120 In addition, the
NEC, which approved the final selection of candidates, used its
power to veto candidates who did not support government policies.121 In spite of the doubts as to the existence of a real choice
for Rwandan voters, the 2001 district elections were considered
a substantial step towards democracy.122
III. SOURCE OF OBLIGATION TO HOLD FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS
As discussed in the introduction, the international legal
community has recognized an emerging right to democratic

114. The Arusha Peace Accords stipulated that an independent Electoral
Commission had to guarantee the organization of free and fair elections.
Arusha Protocol, supra note 94, art. 24(c).
115. Having identified an overly centralized state as one of the primary
causes of the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government adopted a policy of
“consensual democracy” in which the country was divided into districts that
were to be run at the administrative level through collective decision-making.
See ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 3–5.
116. National Electoral Commission, at http://www.comelena.gov.rw/index
eng.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
117. See RWANDA CONST. art. 180 (2003).
118. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at ii.
119. Id. at iii.
120. Id. at 19.
121. Id. at iii.
122. Id. at 20.
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123
Thomas Franck, the legal scholar who first ingovernance.
troduced this theory, argues that democratic entitlement has
become an international norm.124 Therefore, countries seeking
legitimacy internationally must conform to the norms of the
international community.125 In order to conform to this norm,
126
countries must govern with the consent of their citizens. This
is especially important in countries emerging from transitional
periods where validation by the international community is
paramount.127
According to Franck, self-determination, an internationallyguaranteed human right, is the primary basis of democratic
entitlement.128 Franck interprets the right to self-determination
as the right of “peoples in all states to free, fair and open participation in the democratic process of governance freely chosen
by each state.”129 Democracy can be defined as involving three
central rights: “the right to take part in government, the right
to vote and be elected, and the right to equal access to public
service.”130 Thus, free and fair elections are crucial elements of
democratic governance.
“Free and fair elections” is the general term used to describe
the international standard for political participation in governance.131 The right to such elections, however, presupposes the
existence of other human rights, such as freedoms of expres-

123. Franck, supra note 5, at 46–47.
124. Id. at 47.
125. Id. at 48.
126. Id. at 46.
127. See OAS Charter, supra note 8 (“representative democracy is an indispensable condition for [the] stability, peace and development….”). See also
Franck, supra note 5, at 50. Franck also notes that election monitoring can be
particularly useful where there is doubt as to the legitimacy of a regime. Id.
at 75.
128. Id. at 52.
129. Id. at 59 (Although the meaning of self-determination has different
interpretations in international law, Franck interprets it as a peoples’ right to
inclusion in their government’s politics rather than the right of a people to
become an independent state).
130. Muna Ndulo, The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment
in Africa, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 315, 334 (2003).
131. Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A Proposal for United Nations Involvement in National Politics, 30 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 287, 294 (1997).
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132
Moreover, the holdsion, thought, assembly and association.
ing of free and fair elections may not always be sufficient if the
candidates are not truly committed to democracy.133 However,
free and fair elections may serve as “evidence of consent to the
process by which a populace is consulted by its government.”134
Thus, free and fair elections legitimize governance.
Evidence of the right to democratic governance can be found
in both international customary law and treaties. Because
countries are required to conform their laws to their international obligations, evidence of an obligation to hold free and fair
elections can also be found in the domestic law of Nigeria and
Rwanda.

A. Customary International Law
A basis for the right to democratic governance can be found in
customary law. Customary law results from the practice of
states that are followed out of a sense of legal obligation, or
opinio juris.135 As of 1991, more than 110 governments are legally committed to permitting multi-party, secret ballot elections.136 Furthermore, as of 2003, more than three-quarters of
African countries have adopted democratic systems of governance.137 The existence of a rule of customary international law
is generally more difficult to confirm because it is not codified in
a single binding document. However, evidence of customary
law can be found in the practice of states such as governmental
acts and official statements of policy.138 Furthermore, treaties
may also constitute evidence of customary law if they are widely
accepted.139
The UN has become increasingly involved in promoting democracy. In 1993, the UN Security Council authorized member
132. See Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 449, 458 (1997), available at http://
www.ejil.org/journal/Vol8/No3/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Restatement (Third) on Foreign Relations Law § 102(2), cmt. c [hereinafter Restatement].
136. Franck, supra note 5, at 47.
137. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 318.
138. Restatement, supra note 135, § 102 cmt. b.
139. Id. § 102(3).
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states to use force to restore the democratic government in
Haiti.140 Aside from this Security Council resolution, UN action
has been primarily in the form of electoral assistance. From
1991 to 2001, the UN received requests for electoral assistance
from no less than fifty-three countries, including Nigeria and
Rwanda.141 These UN actions reflect the theory that democratic
entitlement is an international norm. UN General Assembly
Resolutions also provide evidence supporting a legal right to
democratic governance. Although General Assembly Resolutions are not binding, if passed with overwhelming support they
may constitute strong evidence of customary law.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example,
was passed with overwhelming support in 1948.142 Although
this resolution does not have the force of a treaty, over the years
it has gained such esteem that it may constitute a customary
rule of international law.143 It articulates a right to political
participation and states “[t]he will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority for the government.”144 It further states
“this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage.”145 It also articulates rights that are essential components of democratic
entitlement, such as freedoms of opinion, expression,146 assembly and association.147
More recent resolutions reinforce the notion that a right to
democratic governance exists and that free and fair elections
are a necessary element of democracy. In 1991, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections.”148
This resolution was committed to enhancing the UN’s role in
140. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 336.
141. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Annex 1,
Agenda Item 131(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/344 (2001).
142. See Franck, supra note 5, at 61.
143. Id.
144. Universal Declaration on Human Rights, art. 21, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
145. Id.
146. Id. art. 19.
147. Id. art. 20.
148. See G.A. Res. 45, U.N. GAOR, 69th Plenary mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/150 (1990).
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the electoral process, especially in countries seeking to
strengthen their electoral systems.149 In 2001, a resolution
called upon states to encourage democracy through the “development of … an electoral system that ensures periodic, free and
fair elections.”150 It further expressed its commitment to the
151
“process of democratization of States.”
B. Treaties
Additional evidence of the right to democratic governance can
be found in treaties in which the right to political participation
has been codified. The terms of a treaty are legally binding on
its signatories and the parties must implement and enforce domestic laws to conform to their treaty obligations.152 Both
Rwanda and Nigeria are signatories without qualifications to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)153 and the African Charter on Human and People’s
Rights (African Charter).154 Additionally, both are parties to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), however, only Nigeria is a signatory without
reservation.155 All three treaties set forth provisions for civil
and political freedom for all people.
The ICCPR, one of the most important multilateral human
rights treaties, was ratified in 1966.156 Nigeria became a party
157
158
The right to political
in 1993 and Rwanda did so in 1975.
149. See id. ¶ 9.
th
150. Promoting and Consolidating Democracy, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 55
Sess., 81st Plenary mtg. ¶ 1(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (2001).
151. Id. at 2.
152. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 27,
1980, arts. 26–27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 338 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
(Nigeria became a party on July 31, 1969 and Rwanda became a party on Jan.
3, 1980. Both are signatories without qualifications.).
153. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 25(a), 999 U.N.T.S. 85, 273, 275 [hereinafter ICCPR].
154. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
art. 13, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217, 263, 266 [hereinafter African Charter].
155. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 69 [hereinafter
ICESCR].
156. ICCPR, supra note 153, 999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
157. Id. at 273.
158. Id. at 172 n.1.
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participation is evident in Article 25, which provides that all
people have the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.159 The
ICCPR further provides that there will be “genuine periodic
elections” that demonstrate the “free expression of the will of
the electors.”160 Thus, free and fair elections are an integral
part of the right to political participation. Furthermore, the
ICCPR guarantees certain fundamental human rights, such as
freedoms of thought,161 expression162 and association,163 which are
the underpinnings of a free and fair election.
The African Charter was ratified in 1981164 and both Nigeria
and Rwanda became parties to it in 1983.165 The Charter is
committed to the promotion and protection of people’s rights
and freedoms, including civil and political rights.166 Evidence
supporting a right to democratic governance can be found in
Article 13, which states “every citizen shall have the right to
participate freely in the government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives.”167 Thus, citizens have the right to vote and be elected. Finally, the African
Charter guarantees certain human rights whose existence are a
necessary component of holding free and fair elections, such as
freedoms of association168 and assembly.169
Additionally, both Nigeria and Rwanda are parties to the
ICESCR170 which states that “[a]ll peoples have the right to selfdetermination” and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status.”171 While there is no specific
provision articulating the right to political participation, according to Franck’s interpretation, self-determination entails free,
fair and open participation in the democratic process of govern159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 179.
Id. art. 25(b).
Id. art. 18.
Id. art. 19(2).
Id. art. 22.
African Charter, supra note 154, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 217.
Id. at 245 n.1.
See id. at 246.
Id. at 248.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 11.
ICESCR, supra note 155, 993 U.N.T.S. at 172 n.1.
Id. at 173.
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172
Thus, the ICESCR can be read to support a right to
ance.
democratic governance.

C. Other Evidence
Although Nigeria and Rwanda are not legally bound by trea173
ties to which they are not a party, the existence of other treaties guaranteeing a right to political participation demonstrates
that it is a widely accepted right. The American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention) sets forth provisions
guaranteeing the right to political participation.174 Article 23
states that every citizen has the right to vote and be elected in
genuine and periodic elections.175 This provision is similar to
Article 25 of the ICCPR,176 which further substantiates the theory that democratic governance is customary law. Furthermore, fundamental human rights relating to political participation are also guaranteed, such as freedoms of thought, opinion,177 association178 and assembly.179
Additionally, the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol)
articulates a right to democratic governance.180 Article 3 states
that parties shall hold “free elections…under conditions which
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people….”181
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted this to
mean that states are required to permit their citizens to participate in free and open elections.182
The existing customary law and treaty law make clear that
democratic governance is, in fact, an international norm. As an

172. Franck, supra note 5, at 52.
173. Restatement, supra note 135, § 102(3).
174. See American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18,
1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, 145 [hereinafter American Convention].
175. Id. at 151.
176. ICCPR, supra note 153, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
177. American Convention supra note 174, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 148–49.
178. Id. art. 16.
179. Id. art. 15.
180. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force May 18, 1954, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S.
262, 264.
181. Id. at 264.
182. Franck, supra note 5, at 66.
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183

Furinternational norm, states are obliged to conform to it.
thermore, the failure to conform to this norm constitutes a violation of international law.184 Thus, countries that hold elections in politically repressive atmospheres marked with electoral fraud have failed to conform to this norm and have violated international law.
IV. EVIDENCE OF THE FAILURE TO FULFILL OBLIGATIONS
As discussed above, there is evidence supporting the existence of an international obligation to hold free and fair elections. While interpretations as to what constitutes free and fair
may differ,185 it is clear that “elections cannot be merely used to
lend authority to borderline authoritarian regimes.”186 Elections
in which the party in power retains its power by manipulation,
electoral fraud and intimidation clearly do not satisfy the criteria of free and fair. Furthermore, instances such as these violate the right to democratic governance because the election
results do not reflect the will of the people.
The African Charter and the ICCPR, as discussed above, support the existence of a right to democratic governance.187 As
signatories, Nigeria and Rwanda are obligated to conform their
domestic laws to fulfill their treaty obligations.188 Furthermore,
Article 26 of the African Charter states that parties have a
“duty… to allow the establishment and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion and
protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the present
Charter.”189 This part of the Note will examine the political atmosphere surrounding the recent 2003 elections in Nigeria and
Rwanda and discuss how these countries failed to fulfill their
183. See Restatement, supra note 135, at § 102 (noting that sources of a rule
of international law can be “in the form of customary law, by international
agreement or by derivation from general principles common to the major legal
systems of the world.”).
184. Id.
185. Gassama, supra note 131, at 294.
186. Amy N. Lippincott, Note, Is Uganda’s “No Party” System Discriminatory Against Women and a Violation of International Law?, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L
L. 1137, 1153 (2000).
187. See supra Part III, B.
188. See African Charter, supra note 154, art. 1, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 246;
ICCPR, supra note 153, art. 2(1–2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173.
189. African Charter, supra note 154, art. 26, 1520 U.N.T.S. at 250.
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international obligations to hold free and fair elections. It will
also examine some of the shortcomings of the national institutions created to ensure that elections are free and fair.
A. Nigeria
The Nigerian government still reflects the ethnic division
that has existed since the country achieved independence. All
of its military heads of state have come from the Hausa ethnic
group, except for General Ironsi and General Obasanjo, the current President of Nigeria.190 The Presidential lineups reflected
the divisions along ethnic lines as they generally consisted of a
Northerner with a Southern running mate or vice versa.191 Additionally, the 2003 elections reflected the strong influence the
military still has on Nigerian politics. Not only was President
Obasanjo’s main rival, General Buhari, a former military
leader, two of the other candidates who ran for the presidency
were also former members of the military.192
1. 2003 Elections
Many of the problems that have plagued Nigeria since its
first attempt at civilian rule were reflected in the most recent
April 2003 elections in which President Obasanjo of the People’s
Democratic Party (PDP) was re-elected with sixty-two percent
of the vote.193 The elections were marred by reports of numerous cases of electoral fraud such as underage voting, multiple
voting, stuffing ballot boxes, snatching of ballot boxes and falsi-

190. Oko, Confronting Transgressions, supra note 12, at 117 n.158.
191. EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION, NIGERIA FINAL
REPORT 9 (2003) [hereinafter EUEOM REPORT], at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/nigeria/rep03.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
192. Irin Web Special on Nigeria, supra note 61 (Maj-Gen. Ike Nwachukwu
was a former foreign minister in a previous military government and Emeka
Odumegwu-Ojukwu was a colonel in the Nigerian army who led the attempted secession of the eastern region that resulted in the Biafra civil war in
1967).
193. Lara Maupin, Lesson Plan, Nigeria Elections, NEWSHOUR EXTRA
(2003), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/lessonplans/world/nig
eria_4-23.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). (President Obasanjo’s primary
opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim former military leader, won thirtytwo percent).
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194
Election observers noted that the estabfication of results.
lished political parties, such as the PDP, were the parties primarily involved in the electoral malpractice.195 In addition to
the controversy surrounding the presidential elections, there
were numerous challenges to the elections for state governorship, senator, and legislative seats.196 This caused some to
name the election 2003 “auction, selection or deception 2003.” 197

2. Electoral Law
The Electoral Law of 2002 sets forth numerous provisions
governing the electoral process in Nigeria.198 However, the 2003
elections reflect the inadequacy and inconsistency of many of its
provisions.
The Electoral Law does not provide an adequate mechanism
for redressing abuses by the INEC and political parties because
the only way to challenge an election or election results is by
bringing an election petition before the appropriate Election
Tribunal.199 However, only candidates or political parties may

194. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 37.
195. Id. at 42.
196. The Lagos State Election Tribunal dismissed Anthony Olufunso Williams’ petition challenging his opponent’s Bula Tinubu’s win and confirmed
Tinubu as the governor of Lagos. Innocent Anaba, Electoral Tribunal Confirms Tinubu’s Election, THE VANGUARD, June 3, 2003. Collins Eselomo challenged the election of Solomon Funkekeme to the State House of assembly
citing large-scale irregularities in the election result. Tribunal Upholds Election of Lawmaker, DAILY TRUST, Aug. 12, 2003. The Delta State Election Tribunal upheld the election noting that the petitioner did not want to pursue his
case. Id. Willy Ezugwu challenged the Independent National Electoral
Commission’s (INEC) declaration of Fidelis Okoro as the senator for Enugu
North in the Enugu Election Tribunal. Tribunal Dismisses INEC’s Motion
Against Proceedings, DAILY TRUST, Aug. 8, 2003.
197. Ahmadu Kurfi, The 2003 Elections and its Aftermath at
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/articles/2003_elections_and_its_aftermath.
htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
198. See generally Electoral Law (2002) (Nig.).
199. Id. § 131(1). The appropriate Election Tribunal for Presidential elections is the Court of Appeals; for all other elections petitions must be brought
before the Election Tribunal established by the Electoral Law. Id. § 131(2).
See also § 134(1) (“[a]n election may be questioned on any of the following
grounds…(b) that the election was invalid by reason of corrupt practice or non
compliance with the provisions of this Act; (c) that the respondent was not
duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the election.”).
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200
Voters may file a complaint with the
bring these petitions.
Public Complaints Commission, but this institution has no
method of enforcing any of its findings.201 Thus, those who are
most affected, the voters, do not have an adequate means of redress.
Section 36 of the Electoral Law provides that each party may
have representatives at each polling station for which they have
a candidate.202 However, there is no limit to the number of
agents who may be present, which facilitated harassment of
voters by party agents. For example, PDP Party agents were
observed checking the ballots before putting them into ballot
boxes.203 At another polling station, a PDP agent was observed
specifically telling a voter to vote for General Obasanjo.204
The Electoral Law does not provide a strict method for publication of election results. Section 61 has been interpreted as not
requiring that results be posted publicly while votes are being
counted.205 Thus, electoral officers simply declared the winners
without issuing any public notice.206 However, the method of
counting as well as the time it took raised doubts as to the validity of the results.207 Furthermore, election observers, as well
as some political parties, were unable to obtain a breakdown of
the results.208 The concerns of credibility were verified when
election observers, after piecing together information, produced
figures that were unrealistic given the actual number of registered voters compared to the number of votes counted.209

3. INEC
Although the INEC is primarily responsible for ensuring that
elections are free and fair, it suffers from several structural and
administrative defects that prevent it from fulfilling its responsibilities. In addition, the INEC’s dependence on the govern200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. § 133(1)(a)–(b).
EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 14.
Electoral Law § 36 (2002) (Nig.).
EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 36 n.27.
Id. (The polling station was located in Bokkos, LGA.).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ment prevents it from operating as an independent institution.
Given the INEC’s apparent acquiescence in the reported instances of electoral fraud, it is clear that the INEC is not operating as the independent, unbiased, neutral entity that it was
created to be.
The basic structure of the INEC reflects its dependence on
the government. The INEC is composed of twelve commissioners and a chairman who are directly appointed by the President
with the approval of the Council of State.210 The Resident Electoral Commission (REC) administers INEC functions at the
state level and each state office is headed by a Resident Electoral Commissioner who is also directly appointed by the President but without the approval of Senate.211
Furthermore, the INEC depends on the government for its
funding. The INEC’s budget must be approved before any
funds are allocated.212 In addition, there appears to be no distinction between operational budgets and electoral budgets.213
Thus, the provisions governing the appointment of electoral
commissioners, as well as the lack of independent funding, do
not adequately guarantee the independence of the INEC.
The INEC, which is authorized to issue specific guidelines,
failed to do so in areas that need the most regulation, such as
campaign and political party financing. The Electoral Law provides for a threshold of twenty Nairas in campaign expenditures per registered voter.214 However, PDP party members
were observed distributing hundreds of new bicycles to potential voters.215 In other areas, outright bribery of voters by PDP
agents was observed.216
Furthermore, the guidelines issued by the INEC were overly
restrictive and, thus, prevented many political parties from registering. In late 2002, the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled that
the guidelines were too restrictive and overturned them.217 As a
210. NIG. CONST. 3rd sched. § 6(a)(iv). See also EUEOM REPORT, supra note
191, at 17.
211. NIG. CONST. 3rd sched. § 14(2)(a).
212. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 18.
213. Id.
214. Electoral Law § 84 (2002) (Nig.).
215. EUEOM REPORT, supra note 191, at 27 n.16.
216. Id. at 34 n.23.
217. Id. at 13.
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result of this ruling, twenty-six parties registered for the elections.218 However, these parties did not have adequate time to
prepare for the elections and consequently were at a disadvantage to the incumbent political parties.
The failure of the INEC to adhere to and interpret the electoral law was a significant shortcoming in the 2003 elections.
Furthermore, the flagrant disregard of electoral procedures by
polling and party agents undermined the democratic foundation
of the electoral process. The Nigerian government has emerged
from a long period of military rule in which democracy was
nothing more than a facade. While there have been substantial
improvements since the return to civilian rule, elections marred
by widespread patterns of electoral fraud such as these fail to
meet the international criteria for free and fair elections. Thus,
Nigeria has failed to meet its international obligation to hold
free and fair elections.
B. Rwanda
Since the RPF has been in power, the distinction between it
and the government has become practically non-existent.219 As
a result it has been able to enjoy a prominence in politics. Part
of the RPF’s power lies in the fact that it was the party that essentially ended the genocide.220 As a result of this authority,
challenges to the RPF are often viewed as challenges to national unity. In fact, any political party that has attempted to
challenge RPF power has been effectively silenced by accusations of promoting ethnic divisions, 221 creating an atmosphere of
political repression. While the desire to exert strict control over
the political process is desirable given the tragic events of the
218. Id.
219. NAT’L DEM. INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, ASSESSMENT OF RWANDA’S PREELECTION POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES 4
(Aug. 3–11, 2003) [hereinafter NDI REPORT], at http://www.access
democracy.org/library/1642_rw_assessment_092203.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2005).
220. See Toby Manhire, What They Said About the Vote in Rwanda, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2003 (“Mr. Kagame derives moral authority from the fact
that he is the leader of the group that single-handedly stopped the genocide.”).
221. Article 33 of the Rwanda Constitution states “[p]ropagation of ethnic,
regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable
by law.” RWANDA CONST. art. 33 (2003).
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1994 genocide, “democracy depends on certain values, such as
tolerance and trust….”222 Thus, in order for the process of democratization to fully take effect in Rwanda, the RPF must
open the political arena to its opposition.
1. 2003 Elections
In August 2003, the first multi-party elections were held
since the 1994 genocide. Incumbent President Kagame won the
223
presidency with approximately ninety-five percent of the vote.
Although the NEC proclaimed the elections free and fair, many
election monitors and international observers were skeptical
about the election results.224 European Union (EU) election
monitors reported that President Kagame’s representatives
controlled many of the voting stations and intimidated electoral
officials and voters.225 At some polling stations the monitors
claimed that they were simply denied access.226 The Amani Forum, another team of observers from the Great Lakes Region in
Africa, reported that it was “difficult to say that the elections
were free and fair.”227

222. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 341.
223. Although there are small discrepancies in the percentage of votes cast
for President Kagame, it appears that 95% is the most accurate. BBC News,
Rwandan President Claims Landslide (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Rwandan
President], at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/africa/3178611.stm (94%) (last visited Apr. 1, 2005); Arthur
Asiimwe, Small Parties to Back RPF Again, ALL AFRICA, Sept. 3, 2003 (95%);
Supreme Court Confirms Kagame’s Victory, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
(PANA) DAILY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 4, 2003 [hereinafter Kagame’s Victory]
(95.05%).
224. Amnesty International issued a press release stating that the RPF
continually harassed opposition supporters and engaged in unlawful tactics in
order to silence the opposition or force members to join the RPF. AMNESTY
INT’L, PRESS RELEASE, RWANDA: RUN-UP TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS MARRED
BY THREATS AND HARASSMENT, (AI Index: AFR 47/010/2003) (Aug. 22, 2003)
[hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE], available at http://web.
amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR470102003 (last visited Apr. 9, 2005);
Grace Matsiko & Geoffrey Kamali, A Look at Kagame’s Landslide Win, ALL
AFRICA, Sept. 3, 2003.
225. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224 (Colette Flesch was head of the
European Union delegation that monitored the elections).
226. Id.
227. Id. (The Amani Forum is made up of members of Parliament from the
Great Lakes Region).
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228
Faustin Twagiramungu, President Kagame’s primary opponent, petitioned the Supreme Court to nullify the election results.229 During the campaign, Twagiramungu was forced to run
as an independent after his political party, Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), was banned for allegedly promoting politics based on ethnicity.230 He claimed that the RPF engaged in
intimidation tactics to pressure voters into voting for Kagame.231
He also cited incidents of vote-rigging and violations of the electoral law.232 On September 3, 2003 the Supreme Court upheld
the results of the presidential elections.233 The Court dismissed
Twagiramungu’s petition after ruling that his petition was not
supported by material evidence.234 Although this may have been
true, the fact that the President of the Supreme Court is an
RPF member235 certainly raises doubts as to the impartiality of
the Court’s ruling.

2. Constitutional Violations
In 2003, a new constitution was approved in Rwanda. Article
52 recognizes a multi-party system of government.236 Thus, the
norm of democratic entitlement is reinforced by the notion that
the people must consent to the way they are governed. The recognition of a right to political freedom is also evident in Article
33, which guarantees “freedom of thought, opinion, conscience

228. Twagiramungu was the former Prime Minister of the post-genocide
government. He resigned due to differences with the RPF and spent eight
years in exile in Belgium. Robert Walker, Profiles: Kagame’s Opponents, BBC
NEWS (Aug. 22, 2003), at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3174211.stm.
229. BBC NEWS, Rwanda Poll Challenge Rejected (Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Rwanda Poll] at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3201931.stm.
230. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224.
231. Asiimwe, supra note 223; see also Rwanda Poll, supra note 229.
232. Asiimwe, supra note 223.
233. Rwanda Poll, supra note 229.
234. Kagame’s Victory, supra note 223.
235. In addition to Simeon Rwagasore, the President of the Supreme Court,
the leaders of the judicial fora, both courts and tribunals, were RPF members.
INT’L CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY
POLITICAL LIBERALISATION, App. E, (2002) [hereinafter ICG REPORT 2], at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400453_091020
01.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
236. RWANDA CONST. art. 52 (2003).
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237
The 2003 elections,
and the public manifestation thereof.”
however, reflect that the democratic process was undermined by
the numerous violations of constitutional provisions.
Under the Constitution, citizens are guaranteed the right to
freedom of expression and opinion.238 The campaign period leading up to the election, however, was marred by allegations of
“government-sponsored intimidation.”239 According to Amnesty
International, the RPF has routinely used intimidation and violence against the opposition.240 One voter reported that when he
attempted to vote for another candidate, an RPF supporter
grabbed his ballot and told him “not to waste his time.”241 Incidents such as this indicate that the government has not respected this fundamental constitutional right.
Article 53 of the Constitution provides that citizens are free
to join or not join political organizations.242 During the campaign period, the RPF reportedly used coercion to force people
to attend its rallies.243 In addition, many opposition supporters
were detained and released only after agreeing to announce
their support for the RPF.244 The fact that six of the eight political parties in Rwanda supported President Kagame245 lends credence to the allegation that the opposition was intimidated. At
the very least, it is strong evidence of the RPF’s control over the
government.
While freedom of association is guaranteed by the Constitution, this right, like others, may be limited to maintain national
security.246 Consequently, this right remained suspended during the entire transitional period. When the law governing po-

237. Id. art. 33.
238. Id.
239. High Turnout as People Vote in First Election Since Genocide, THE
VANGUARD, Aug. 27, 2003. See also Guy Selassie, Election 2003: Incumbent
Wins Ballot, Loses Credibility in Rwandan Poll, WORLD MARKET ANALYSIS,
Aug. 27, 2003.
240. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224.
241. BBC News, Rwanda Poll Splits African Press (Aug. 28, 2003), at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/af
rica/3187949.stm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
242. RWANDA CONST. art. 53 (2003).
243. AMNESTY INT’L PRESS RELEASE, supra note 224.
244. Id.
245. Asiimwe, supra note 223.
246. RWANDA CONST. arts. 35, 43 (2003).
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litical organizations was enacted on June 26, 2003, political
parties and candidates had two months to organize and begin
campaigning. Political organizing, however, is still prohibited
on the local level making it difficult for the opposition to garner
support.248 The opposition could hardly compete with the unfair
advantage that the RPF had, because the RPF was the only
party permitted to function when political organizing was
banned.
In addition, it appears that the RPF enjoyed many advantages that the opposition did not during the campaign period.
Under the Electoral Law, media time is to be allocated equally
among the candidates;249 however, reports indicate that the RPF
was granted considerably more time on the airwaves.250 Although the NEC president reported that the RPF was the only
party that had held public rallies in nearly every province,251
allegations that the RPF coerced people into attending its rallies undermine this declaration of RPF popularity.252
Although Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of
press and information,253 the media is subject to many government-imposed restrictions. Members of the press who have
criticized the government, particularly journalists, have continuously faced the threat of imprisonment, detention or exile.254
The only licensed television and radio stations are owned by the
government and, thus, subject to its control.255 The government’s control over the media may be a result of rampant use of
the airwaves to broadcast propaganda during the genocide.256

247. See Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and
Politicians (2003) (Rwanda).
248. RWANDA CONST. art. 52 (2003); see also NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at
2, 4.
249. NDI REPORT, supra note 218, at 9.
250. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224.
251. NEC Sets Deadline for Submission of Candidate Representatives,
RWANDA INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Aug. 8, 2003), at http://www.rwanda.net/
english/News/news082003/news08082003.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
252. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 4.
253. RWANDA CONST. art. 34 (2003).
254. AMNESTY INT’L, RWANDA REPORT 2003, at http://web.amnesty.org/
report2003/rwa-summary-eng (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
255. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 5.
256. See generally Metzl, supra note 100, at 628 (discussing how the radio
was used to incite ethnic tension in Rwanda).
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However, the fact that the RPF appeared to have unlimited access to the media while it restricted the opposition’s access undermined the justification for such strict control.
According to the Organic Law Governing Political Organizations and Politicians, the assets of political organizations are to
be derived from contributions from members, donations, legacies, its property, activities or state grants.257 While it appeared
that other political parties and candidates did not have many
resources, the RPF reportedly gave gifts including livestock, tshirts and memorabilia at its rallies, leading to the conclusion
that state resources were being used.258 Although there are no
clear rules on the use of government resources for campaigning,
Article 32 of the Constitution prohibits the embezzlement of
public property.259 If state resources were used, this would be
an unconstitutional use of government funds.
3. NEC
The NEC was created to ensure the presence of fair and free
elections.260 There are several inherent problems, however, that
prevent the NEC from being the independent, neutral institution it was intended to be. The structure of the NEC renders it
dependent on the RPF-controlled government, resulting in a
strong connection between the government and the NEC. In
addition, the NEC has considerable discretion to interpret the
electoral law, thus, its policies are very difficult to challenge.
The NEC is composed of a Permanent Secretariat that includes an Executive Secretary and five Deputies who are nominated by the Prime Minister with the approval of Cabinet and
the Council of Commissioners elected to serve on the NEC before and after elections.261 Because the government is controlled
by the RPF, the Permanent Secretariat reflects this political
makeup. In addition, the confirmation of District Commissioners can only be made by the Permanent Secretariat which is

257. See Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and
Politicians art. 21 (2003) (Rwanda).
258. NDI REPORT, supra note 219, at 4.
259. RWANDA CONST. art. 32 (2003).
260. See id. art. 180.
261. See National Electoral Commission, supra note 116; ICG REPORT 1,
supra note 106, at 12–13.
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262
dominated by the RPF. Consequently, most electoral commissioners are RPF supporters. Thus, members of the government
may effectively secure their jobs through their appointment of
members of the NEC.
Despite the NEC’s purported neutrality, there appears to be a
strong connection between it and the RPF. For example, in
2002, the President of the Commission and the Executive Secretary were notoriously powerful RPF members and their decisions were often the decisive factor when choosing candidates
for local electoral commissions.263 The current NEC president
touted the fact that people were defecting from Twagiramungu’s
camp at a press conference during the campaign period.264 This
raised suspicions that he was acting as a campaign agent for
the RPF.265 Given the connection between the NEC and the
government, the NEC’s neutrality and independence is doubtful.
Another problem is that the NEC has considerable discretion
in interpreting and defining the electoral law. Article 45 of the
Rwandan Constitution provides that all citizens have the right
to participate in government, whether directly or through
freely-chosen representatives.266 The Electoral Law provides all
electoral candidates are required to be “persons of integrity,”
yet the law does not provide a definition of integrity.267 Thus,
what constitutes integrity is largely left to the discretion of the
NEC, which allows the NEC to use this vague qualification as a
pretext to prevent certain citizens from participating in government.
In addition, the NEC has the authority to ban any political
party that promotes politics based along ethnic lines, a violation
under the Electoral Law and the Constitution.268 Art. 38 (1) of
the Organic Law Governing Political Organizations and Politi-

262. See National Electoral Commission, supra note 116; ICG REPORT 1,
supra note 106, at 12.
263. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 12 (The former President of the
Commission was Protais Musoni and the Executive Secretary was Christophe
Bazivamo).
264. Matsiko & Kamali, supra note 224.
265. Id.
266. RWANDA CONST. art. 45 (2003).
267. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 14.
268. Id. at 16; RWANDA CONST. art. 54 (2003).
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cians provides that during the campaign period, every politician
or political party is obliged to “avoid any speech, writing or any
other kind of action based on discrimination or division.”269 Article 54 of the Constitution prohibits political organizations
from basing themselves on race or ethnic groups.270 Since 2000,
several parties have been exiled on the grounds that they were
fostering ethnic divisionism; there appears, however, to be little
or no evidence supporting these allegations.271 Many suspect
that these accusations are a pretext to silence political opponents.272
Although the Electoral Law provides for appeals to the Supreme Court, the NEC interpreted this to mean that the court
provided a forum for allegations of “ballot manipulation” but
not for challenges to NEC policies.273 Individuals may challenge
NEC policy by first appealing to the district level, the provincial
level, the NEC and then, finally, to the Supreme Court.274 As a
result of this lengthy and burdensome process, few complaints
are successful.275 Thus, any redress for an abuse of power by the
NEC is subject to its own interpretation of the Electoral Law.
The strict political control exercised by the RPF during the
pre-election period suggests that the 2003 elections did not
truly reflect the will of the people of Rwanda. Furthermore, the
repression of the opposition violated treaty obligations to ensure
equal access to public service and freedom of association.276
269. Organic Law No. 16/2003 Governing Political Organizations and Politicians art. 38(1) (2003) (Rwanda).
270. RWANDA CONST. art. 54 (2003).
271. As of 2003, approximately eleven political parties were in exile: Rwandan Democratic Alliance (ADR); Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation (ADRN IGIHANGO); Alliance for National Regeneration (ARENA);
African Democratic Congress (CDA); Congres du Peuple (a party created from
the split in the ARENA party); Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR); Resistance Forces for Democracy (FRD); Movement for
Peace, Democracy and Development (MPDD); Monarchist Movement
(NATION); Democratic Rally for the Return of Refugees (RDR); Union of
Rwandan Democratic Forces (UFDR). ICG REPORT 2, supra note 235, at 40–
41.
272. Profile: Rwanda’s Strongman, supra note 110.
273. ICG REPORT 1, supra note 106, at 14.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See e.g., African Charter, supra note 153, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; ICCPR,
supra note 154, 999 U.N.T.S. 85.
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Faced with the difficult task of rebuilding a nation after genocide, the Rwandan government has embarked on a mission to
build national unity and rid the country of the ethnic divisions
that led to the horrific events of 1994. Although Rwanda’s system of consensual democracy is based on public participation in
public affairs, in practice, this policy has been used to effectively silence those who do not espouse RPF ideology. By refusing to let the opposition effectively compete, the government
has undermined its attempt to hold free and fair elections.
V. CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE AND
FAIR ELECTIONS
As established above, there is an international norm of democratic governance. Free and fair elections are an indispensable element of democratic governance. The most obvious
benefit of holding free and fair elections is democracy.277 Democratic elections are generally defined as elections that are
fairly administered, grant equal voting rights to those who
qualify to vote, and permit eligible voters to elect and be
elected.278 These procedural guarantees ensure that an election
is free and fair.279
However, there are other benefits to be derived from holding
free and fair elections. One of those benefits is political legitimacy.280 Free and fair elections signify that results reflect the
free expression of the will of the people. Thus, those who are
elected gain legitimacy. Popular leaders would expect to do
well in elections, but when such leaders participate in undemocratic elections and are victorious, they lose legitimacy.281 Furthermore, free and fair elections lead to international support.
The emerging international norm of democratic governance
mandates that only democracy can validate governance.282
Thus, the international community is reluctant to support governments that have come to power undemocratically.

277. Nhan T. Vu, The Nondemocratic Benefits of Elections, 28 CASE WEST.
RES. J. INT’L L. 395, 395 (1996).
278. Id. at 454.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 455.
281. Id. at 459.
282. Ndulo, supra note 130, at 336.
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Finally, by holding free and fair elections, countries reinforce
their support for human rights. Countries that are parties to
human rights treaties have an obligation to enforce those
rights. Democratic governance presupposes the existence of
fundamental human rights and free and fair elections demonstrate that these rights have been exercised freely.
Lara R. Corchado∗

∗ B.A., Fordham University, J.D. Brooklyn Law School (expected June
2005). I would like to thank my family for their support and encouragement
throughout my law school years. I would especially like to thank my mother,
Helen Corchado, not only for her support but also for her enduring patience.

